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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET T. MILLIKAN, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Case No. 880213-CA 
vs. ) 
CLARK H. MILLIKAN, ) District Court 
Defendant-Respondent. ) D-86-2818 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In her Brief of Appellant, Mrs. Millikan cites authority 
involving abuse of discretion and unjust apportionment of marital 
property. She asked the trial court to award her a present lump 
sum payment of her share of the cash valqe of the Utah and Mayo 
retirement assets. She testified about the problematic issue of 
risk. The trial court made no distribution whatsoever of the 
Utah and Mayo retirement assets, and placed solely upon Mrs. 
Millikan the entire burden of surviving Dr. Millikan to ever 
realize any of those retirement assets. The only retirement 
asset the trial court awarded her was an $8,319 IRA—1.8* of the 
$451,580.53 in total retirement assets. 
The trial court wrongly excluded the Scheinberg letter, 
which contained the most probative and trustworthy evidence Mrs. 
Millikan was ever able to obtain regarding the material fact of 
Dr. Millikan1s Miami private patient income. The trial court 
denied her a continuance to complete discovery of that informa-
tion. The inability to discover Dr. Millikan1s private patient 
income continues to prejudice Mrs. Millikan1s substantial right 
to alimony. 
The trial court erroneously used the homeowners1 policy 60% 
valuation of household contents in finding the average valuation 
of those contents. Instead, the trial court should have used the 
valuation Dr. Millikan made in the 27-page inventory supporting 
the policy. The valuation error amounted to 25% of the actual 
average value of the contents. 
This Court has already denied Dr. Millikan1s claim that Mrs. 
Millikan's appeal is frivolous and request for costs. This Court 
should not reconsider those issues. 
An immediate offset award to Mrs. Millikan now of her 31% 
interest in the Utah and Mayo retirements does not preclude 
consideration of Dr. Millikan's monthly retirement benefits in 
determining alimony. The case law Dr. Millikan cites has been 
expressly disapproved. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MRS. MILLIKAN'S CLAIM OF REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
BASED UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION AND UNJUST APPORTIONMENT OF 
MARITAL PROPERTY, IS MORE THAN SUSTAINED 
BY THE RECORD IN THIS MATTER. 
At the outset of argument in her Brief of Appellant, Mrs. 
Millikan cites Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P. 2d 86 (Utah App. 1988) 
in support of Point I there that the trial court committed 
reversible error in failing to find the present value of the 
substantial Utah and Mayo retirement interests and make an 
immediate offset award. The Carlton cite provides, in pertinent 
part: 
2 
, . . Finally, the trial court's failure to include 
property valuations in divorce actions may constitute 
an abuse of discretion sufficient to.require remand for 
determination. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; Boyle 
v. Boyle, 735 P.2d"at 671. 
756 P. 2d at pp. 87-88. [Brief of Appellant, p. 17; emphasis 
added] This Court vacated the property award in Carlton and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
Likewise, in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) 
the Utah Supreme Court cited the standard of review in a divorce 
proceeding: 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court should make a 
distribution of property and income sd that the parties 
may readjust their lives to their new circumstances as 
well as possible. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 
1982); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d 
1066 (1951). Although this Court may modify decisions 
of the trial court, its apportionment of marital 
property will not be disturbed unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Turner, 649 
P.2d at 8. 
748 P.2d at 1078. 
Mrs. Millikan's claim of reversible error, based upon the 
trial court's abuse of discretion and unjust apportionment of 
marital property, is more than sustained by the record in this 
matter. 
POINT II. THE VALUATION AND APPORTIONMENT OF THE 
RETIREMENT ASSETS BEING PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT, CONTROLLING AUTHORITY ENTITLES 
MRS. MILLIKAN TO AN IMMEDIATE OFFSET AWARD 
NOW OF HER 31* EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THOSE 
RETIREMENT ASSETS. 
A. The Issue of Valuation and Apportionment of the $405,603.53 
Utah and Mayo Retirements is Properly Before this Court. 
In Duqan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote: 
3 
An objection to findings of fact and conclusions of law 
may be made in the form of a motion for a new trial or 
amendment of judgment, procedures governed by Rule 
52(b) and Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
"It is settled that . . . a rule 59 motion is [not] a 
condition precedent to appeal from final judgment.11 
The Nature Conservancy v. Nakila, 4 Hawaii App. 584, 
671 P.2d 1025 (1983); Kahn v. Weldin, 60 Or. App. 365, 
653 P.2d 1268 (1982); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, 
568 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1977). 6A J. Moore, Federal 
Practice § 59.15[3] (2d Ed. 1986) addresses the 
submitted issue in language as follows: 
A motion for a new trial is not a prerequi-
site for an appeal from a judgment; and on 
such appeal review may be had of any legal 
error, properly raised, that appears in the 
record, whether the action be a jury or court 
action. And in the latter action the scope 
of review also embraces the facts, but the 
trial court's findings of fact are not to be 
set aside by the appellate court unless 
clearly erroneous. 
In this proceeding in equity, this Court is free to 
review both the facts and the law as found and applied 
by the trial court, but will not disturb the trial 
court's findings of facts unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them. In re Estate of Hock, 655 
P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 
(Utah 1981); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P. 2d 708 
(Utah 1977). The failure to object to the findings was 
not fatal to defendants1 appeal. . .. 
724 P.2d at 956-957. 
While Mrs. Millikan may not have objected immediately after 
trial to the retirement findings prepared by Dr. Millikan's 
counsel, nevertheless it is crystal clear that Mrs. Millikan 
asked the trial court to award her a present lump sum payment of 
her share of the cash value of the Mayo and Utah retirements. 
Her request, and her analysis of the problematic issue of risk, 
are set out in full in Addendum "E" to her Brief of Appellant. 
Her request was clear: 
4 
Mr, Palmer: Are you asking now for the court to award 
you a present lump sum payment of your share of the 
cash value of those annuities? 
Mrs. Millikan: Yes, I would very much like to have 
that because otherwise, if I am just left with future 
money, it is not worth nearly as much as present money. 
Obviously, that would take care of my needs, and it 
would be immediate. And it wouldn't have to be a 
future possible thing. There is a lot of risk, 
obviously, in hoping to get something in 10 or 15 
years, especially with the history of cancer in my 
family. 
Q. And if Dr. Millikan were to pay out now your share 
of the present value of those plans, he would then be 
taking the risk that he would not live long enough to 
reap his share? 
A. Yes, that's correct. It is a difficult problem, I 
think. 
[Tr. December 1, 1987: 243-245/R. 482: 243-245 (Addendum "E" to 
Brief of Appellant)]. The remainder of Mrs. Millikan's testimony 
regarding the problematic issue of risk is set out in Addendum 
"E" to the Brief of Appellant. 
Mrs. Millikan's testimony regarding the problematic issue of 
risk hardly constitutes a waiver of her right to an award of a 
present lump sum payment of her share of the present cash value 
of the Mayo and Utah retirements. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P. 2d 1226 
(Utah App. 1988); Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 
573 (Utah 1985); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983); 
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 547 P. 2d 219 (Utah 1976); and 
American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomguist, 445 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1968). 
Mrs. Millikan left the problematic issue of risk to the 
trial court. The trial court ducked that issue by failing to 
make findings on the basis of undisputed evidence of the 
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$405,603.53 present value of the Utah and Mayo retirements. The 
trial court's abuse of discretion in failing to make those 
findings, and the clearly unjust and equitable apportionment of 
marital property resulting therefrom, should be reversed by this 
Court. 
It cannot be disputed that Mrs. Millikan asked the trial 
court to award her a present lump sum payment of her share of the 
present cash value of the Mayo and Utah retirements. That issue 
was before the trial court. That issue is properly before this 
Court now. 
B. Dr. Millikan!s Improper Attempts to Supplement the Record Do 
• Not Preclude an Award to Mrs. Millikan of her $125,848.07 
Interest in the Mayo and Utah Retirements. 
In Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the general rule against supplementing the 
record on appeal with matters not before the trial court. Chief 
Justice Crockett wrote: 
. On Appeal to this court we review the judgments 
and orders appealed from on the basis of the record 
upon which the trial court acted, and do not permit the 
supplementing of our record with matters not before the 
trial court. 
472 P.2d at 433. (Footnotes omitted.) See also, Blodqett v. 
Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1988); Chapman v. 
Chapman, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986); Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 
P.2d 128 (Utah 1978); and Watkiss v. Symonds, 385 P. 2d 154, 14 
Utah 2d 406 (Utah 1963), 
Dr. Millikan attempts to supplement the record on appeal 
with Addendums A, B and C to his Brief in Answer to Appeal and in 
Support of Cross-Appeal ("Dr. Millikan's Brief"). The materials 
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in Addendum A and C were admittedly never before the trial court. 
(Dr. Millikanfs Brief, p. 28) The proper way to get Addendum B 
before this Court is by motion under Rule 11(b) of the Rules of 
this Court. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). Dr. 
Millikanfs attempts to supplement the record are clearly impro-
per. In addition, they miss the mark. 
Mrs. Millikan is not seeking and indeed has never sought 
lump sum payments from the Mayo or Utah plans. As set forth on 
pages 30 to 33 of her Brief of Appellant, Mrs. Millikan seeks an 
award of $125,848.07 for her interest in the Mayo and Utah plans 
from the $272,997.13 in CD's, an IRA and annuity the trial court 
awarded Dr. Millikan. The marital assets are clearly sufficient 
to permit the present lump sum cash award Mrs. Millikan asked the 
trial court to make. 
C. Controlling Authority Entitles Mrs. Millikan to an Immediate 
Offset Award Now of Her 31% Equitable Interest in the Joint 
Marital Retirement Assets. 
Dr. Millikan attempts to distinguish the retirement distri-
bution cases cited by Mrs. Millikan on the basis that "they are 
addressed to retirement plans where the spouse had no entitle-
ments to the retirement benefits without a court award." (Dr. 
Millikan's Brief, p. 32.) That hollow distinction without a 
difference begs the question. -In this case, if Mrs. Millikan 
predeceases Dr. Millikan she has no entitlement to the retire-
ments even with a court award. 
Dr. Millikan laboriously argues that "Mrs. Millikan will 
receive roughly 57% of the entire benefits." (Dr. Millikanfs 
Brief, p. 33; emphasis in original.) If she dies before Dr. 
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Millikan, she will receive nothing. Fifty-seven percent of 
nothing is still nothing. Mrs. Millikan is not "full protected" 
in her right to enjoy her share of Dr. Millikan's considerable 
retirement assets. 
Mrs. Millikan asks only for a fair and equitable distribu-
tion now of her equitable interest in the $405,603.53 in Mayo and 
Utah retirement assets. Rather than settle for a "windfall" 57% 
sometime in the future jL_f she survives Dr. Millikan, Mrs. 
Millikan willingly asks now for the mere 31% to which she is 
undisputediy entitled. 
Dr. Millikan cites no case law whatsoever where an election 
under ERISA precludes a state trial court from making an immed-
iate offset distribution of retirement assets. The "irrevocable 
election" argument is a red herring at best. It was attractive 
to the trial court. This Court should reject it for the spurious 
argument that it is. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to find the 
undisputed present value of the Utah and Mayo retirements. The 
trial court compounded that abuse by making .no distribution 
whatsoever of the Mayo and Utah retirement assets. This Court 
should reverse the trial court's non-distribution of retirement 
assets and remand for entry of an immediate offset cash award to 
Mrs. Millikan of $125,848.07 for her equitable interest in those 
retirement assets. 
POINT III. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF THE 
IRA ASSETS. 
Property settlement agreements are not binding upon the 
8 
trial court in divorce proceedings. Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P. 2d 
473 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court failed to find the value 
of the Mayo and Utah retirements and make an . immediate offset 
lump sum award of $125,848.07 to Mrs. Millikan. The trial court 
further abused its discretion in failing to find each party's 
respective percentage interest in the $45,J977 in IRA's and make 
an award to each party in accordance with those percentages. The 
net result is that Mrs. Millikan was awarded only $8,319 of the 
$451,580.53 in Utah, Mayo and IRA retirement assets, a mere 1.8%. 
This is not equitable. 
The trial court's award of the IRA's should be reversed. 
The trial court should be instructed to find each party's 
percentage interest in both IRA's and make awards in accordance 
with those percentages. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO ADMIT THE SCHEINBERG LETTER 
OR GRANT MRS. MILLIKAN A CONTINUANCE TO 
COMPLETE DISCOVERY OF DR. MILLIKAN'S MIAMI 
PRIVATE PATIENT INCOME. 
A. The Scheinberg Letter Should Have Been Admitted Under Rule 
303(24) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Dr. Millikan does not deny entering into an agreement with 
Mrs. Millikan to accomplish discovery of Dr. Scheinberg's 
evidence regarding Dr. Millikan's private patient income at the 
University of Miami. On page 37 of his Brief, Dr. Millikan 
states: 
. . . The parties agreed to interview Dr. Scheinberg by 
telephone to avoid the cost of travel to Miami. 
On page 40, Dr. Millikan states: 
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. , . The depositions of Dr. Scheinberg and the payroll 
clerk were cancelled by stipulation and counsel 
interrogated Dr. Scheinberg by telephone. (R. 482-
Tr. at 258. ) 
It can readily be inferred from Dr. Millikan's admissions 
that any information obtained from Dr. Scheinberg in that three-
way telephone interview would be in lieu of the depositions Mrs. 
Millikan had scheduled and that Mrs. Millikan would be entitled 
to rely on that information. It can also be readily inferred 
that Mrs. Millikan was surprised when, in contravention of the 
agreement, Dr. Millikan objected to the admission of Dr. Schein-
berg ' s letter to Mr. Palmer regarding information discovered in 
the course of that three-way telephone conference. The record 
attests to the surprise. (R. 329-343; 482 - Tr. 249-273.) 
Similarly, Dr. Millikan does not deny that Mrs. Millikan was 
unable to complete his two-day deposition in the one day he 
deigned to be available. Rather, Dr. Millikan attempts to 
justify his evasiveness. He argues, in essence, that if Mrs. 
Millikan or any of her attorneys could not get satisfactory 
income information from him in her October 1986 discovery, her 
May 1987 discovery, her September 1987 discovery, or in Dr. 
Millikan's October 1987 half-completed deposition, then what 
satisfactory income information she finally did get from Dr. 
Scheinberg, pursuant to the three-way telephone-conference-in-
lieu-of-deposition agreement, he really did not intend she could 
use. The trial court committed reversible error in excluding the 
Scheinberg letter and refusing mrs. Millikan a continuance to 
complete discovery of Dr. Millikan's Miami private patient 
income. 
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Rule 803(24) 
Rule 803(24) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it 
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent 
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purpose of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent 
of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particu-
lars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
Rule 803 is the federal rule verbatim. 
In United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298 (5th 
1977), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled: 
In order for evidence to be admitted pursuant to Rule 
803(24), five conditions must be met. These are: 
(1) The proponent of the evidence must give the adverse 
party the notice specified within the rule. 
(2) The statement must have circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness equivalent to the 23 specified 
exceptions listed in Rule 803. 
(3) The statement must be offered as evidence of a 
material fact. 
(4) The statement must be more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts. 
(5) The general purposes of the Federal Rules and the 
interests of justice must best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. 
11 
559 F.2d at 298. 
In Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
vacated summary judgment for a determination of whether the 
deceased declarant was mentally competent when he made a state-
ment the trial court excluded. If competent, Federal Rule 
803(24) mandated admission of the statement and a new trial. 
Utah Rule 803(24) should similarly apply here. 
Notice 
Mrs. Millikan made the letter and her intention to offer it 
at trial known to Dr. Millikan sufficiently in advance of trial 
to provide Dr. Millikan a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it. 
(R. 482: 263, lines 7-22.) Dr. Millikan knew Dr. Scheinberg's 
name and address; Dr. Scheinberg was Dr. Millikan's long-time 
friend and immediate supervisor. 
Trustworthiness 
The Scheinberg letter possessed circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness. He was a hostile witness so far as Mrs. 
Millikan was concerned. There was no reason for him to invent 
the private patient income information the letter contained. 
The evidence the letter contained was developed in the 
course of a stipulated three-way telephone-conference-in-lieu-of-
deposition held between Dr. Scheinberg, Mrs. Millikan1s counsel, 
and Dr. Millikan's counsel. Dr. Millikan's counsel had an 
opportunity in that stipulated three-way telephone conference to 
explore any weaknesses in Dr. Scheinberg's perceptions, memory, 
and narrative of the matters he later reduced to writing and sent 
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to Dr. Millikan!s counsel. (R. 482: 249-273.) 
Evidence of a Material Fact 
The Scheinberg letter was offered as evidence of a material 
fact, namely that the University of Miami would collect approxi-
mately $80,000 in income from private patients Dr. Millikan would 
attend over the term of his 15-month contract, and that Dr. 
Millikan would gross about $1,920 of that as private patient 
income in addition to his regular income. (R. 482 - Tr. 265, 
lines 20-24.) 
More Probative Than Any Other Evidence 
The Scheinberg letter was more probative on the point of Dr. 
Millikan1s Miami private patient income that any other evidence 
Mrs. Millikan was able to procure in either her May 1987 discov-
ery, her September 1987 discovery, or in Dr. Millikan's October 
1987 half-completed deposition. Mrs. Millikan was prepared to 
depose Dr. Scheinberg and the payroll clerk in Miami, but agreed 
by stipulation with Dr. Millikan to cancel the Miami depositions 
to avoid the cost of travel to Miami and to interview Dr. 
Scheinberg in a three-way telephone conference with Dr. Mil-
likan1 s counsel. 
Mrs. Millikan's efforts to procure evidence of Dr. Mil-
likan !s Miami private patient income were more than reasonable. 
That evidence just was not forthcoming. 
The Interests of Justice 
Admissibility of the Scheinberg letter would have been 
consistent with the interests of justice. The trial court would 
have had available a range of private patient income upon which 
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to base an alimony award: the $650 net per month Dr. Millikan 
was willing to admit and the $1,920 gross per month derived from 
the Scheinberg letter. Admission of the Scheinberg letter could 
well have resulted in an additional $400 per month in alimony to 
Mrs. Millikan. 
As it is, Mrs. Millikan has been left to file an Order to 
Show Cause with the Domestic Commissioner in May, 1989, seeking 
judgment against Dr. Millikan for accrued alimony arrearages 
based upon evidence of his "regular, " "PIP," and "incentive" 
income from the University of Miami. 
Proffer 
Mrs. Millikan !s counsel made a proffer of the Scheinberg 
letter evidence and argued its admissibility under Rule 803(24). 
Mrs. Millikanfs substantial right to additional alimony was 
prejudiced by the trial court's exclusion of the Scheinberg 
letter and denial of a continuance. 
B. The Issue of Dr. Millikan's Miami Private Patient Income is 
Not Moot. 
In May, 1989, Mrs. Millikan filed an Order to Show Cause 
with the Domestic Commissioner seeking judgment against Dr. 
Millikan for accrued alimony arrearages based upon evidence of 
his "regular," "PIP," and "incentive" income from the University 
of Miami, Dr. Millikan1s "regular" income check was admitted as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" at trial. (Brief of Appellant, Addendum 
"I," Exhibit "D.") However, Dr. Millikan sent Mrs. Millikan 
copies of his "PIP" checks with his alimony. Some of his "PIP" 
checks included "incentive" income. (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum "I," Exhibit "E.") 
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That Dr. Millikan only sent Mrs. Millikan copies of his 
,fPIPn and "incentive" pay does not render, the Miami income issue 
moot. Instead, it illustrates the problem Mrs. Millikan has 
faced all along: Just how much income does Dr. Millikan derive 
from all sources? Because he has never sent Mrs. Millikan a 
complete copy of his 1987 or 1988 federal income tax return as 
required by paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, Mrs. Millikan 
still does not know what his combined "regular," "PIP," and 
"incentive" income was from the University of Miami, even though 
he left there a year ago. 
The Scheinberg letter should have been admitted at trial or 
upon its denial, Mrs. Millikan should have been granted a 
continuance to complete discovery of Dr. Millikan's private 
patient income. Mrs. Millikan has been substantially prejudiced 
by the exclusion of that evidence and the denial of a continu-
ance . 
This Court should reverse the trial court's exclusion of the 
Scheinberg letter on the basis of Rule 803(24) or remand with 
instructions to permit Mrs. Millikan to complete discovery of Dr. 
Millikan1s Miami private patient income prior to retrial on the 
issue of alimony. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN USING THE HOMEOWNERS' POLICY STANDARD 
60* HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS VALUATION AS EVIDENCE 
IN AVERAGING THE PARTIES' VALUATIONS OF 
THE HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS. 
The trial court found the 23-page typewritten inventory 
attached to the Family Affairs appraisal (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum "J") to be "very incomplete." (R. 482 - Tr. at 342.) 
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That appraisal valued the household contents at $43,300.35, with 
a net value after commission of $30,310. 
In his handwritten four-page addition (Brief of Appellant, 
Addendum "J," pp. "24-27"), Dr. Millikan valued the woodworking 
equipment and wood at $20,776. Mrs. Millikan's figures off to 
the right valued the equipment and wood at $14,226.96. (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 45.) Dr. Millikan never disputed Mrs. Millikan's 
valuations of the items in the first 23 pages of inventory. His 
complaint was simply that she forgot to include the woodworking 
equipment and wood. 
As set out on page 45 of the Brief of Appellant, the range 
of values established by the parties1 own inventory valuations 
would have been $56,438.35 for a high and $49,451.42 for a low. 
Both of this figures are less that the $66,155 valuation found by 
the trial court. 
The homeowners' policy was admitted by stipulation. Its 
impeachment value lay in the 27-page typed and handwritten 
inventory supporting it, and not in the $102,000 Mrs. Millikan 
testified was 60% of the revised appraised value of the struc-
ture. (R. 482 - Tr. at 435.) 
The trial court erred in splitting the difference between 
the $102,000 policy valuation and the Family Affairs appraisal 
value of $30,310 [($102,000 + $30,310) / 2 = $66,155], instead of 
splitting the difference between the policy's 27-page inventory 
as valued by Dr. Millikan ($56,438.35) and the Family Affairs 23-
page inventory furnished by Mrs. Millikan ($49,451.42). The 
correct valuation, using Mrs. Millikan's Family Affairs evidence 
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and Dr. Millikan's 27-page policy inventory impeachment evidence 
should have been: 
$56,438.35 
+ 49,451.42 
$105,889.77 / 2 = $52,944.89 
This Court should reverse the trial court's valuation of the 
household contents at $66,155 and order entry of a valuation of 
$52,944.89, a substantial twenty percent reduction in valuation. 
POINT VI. THE DOCTRINE OF LAW OF THE CASE PRECLUDES 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES OF FRIVOLOUS 
APPEAL AND AWARD OF COSTS. 
In Point IV of his June 6, 1988 Motion of Defendant/Respon-
dent for Summary Affirmance of Judgment and for Attorney's Fees 
and Costs ("Dr. Millikan's Motion for Summary Affirmance"), Dr. 
Mlllikan claimed there was no arguable basis for an assertion of 
error by the district court and that Mrs. Mlllikan's appeal was 
frivolous. Dr. Millikan moved this Court for an Order awarding 
him double costs. Point Six of Dr. Millikan's Brief makes the 
same claim. In fact, much of the language is identical and he 
seeks identical relief. 
This Court summarily denied Dr. Millikan's Motion for 
Summary Affirmance, thereby denying his claim that Mrs. Mil-
likan's appeal is frivolous and denying him double costs. Those 
denials are the law of the case and preclude reconsideration of 
the identical issues raised in Dr. Millikan's Brief. State in 
Interest of C. Y. v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah App. 1988). 
The issues of frivolous appeal and double costs are pre-
sented in the same light in Dr. Mlllikan's brief as in his Motion 
for Summary Affirmance. No exception to the doctrine of law of 
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the case applies. Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 
P. 2d 735 (Utah 1984). This Court should again deny Dr. Mil-
likan's claim of frivolous appeal and motion for costs. 
POINT VII. ALIMONY AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION INVOLVE 
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS WHICH 
PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF "DOUBLE COUNTING" 
Dr. Millikan cites D' Pro v. D'Oro, 454 A.2d 915 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1982) for the proposition that pension benefits cannot be 
considered income to the recipient for an alimony assessment. 
(Dr. Millikan's Brief, p. 63.) However, in Innes v. Innes
 f 542 
A.2d 39 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1988), the Appellate Division of 
the New Jersey Superior Court expressly disapproved as "superfi-
cial" and "unsound" the rationale in D'Pro: 
The argument is unsound because equitable distribution 
and alimony are not the same. They are fundamentally 
different in one important respect: 
[Equitable distribution to a wife] gives 
recognition to the essential supportive role 
played by the wife in the home, acknowledging 
that as homemaker, wife and mother she should 
clearly be entitled to a share of family 
assets accumulated during the marriage. 
Thus, the division of property upon divorce 
is responsive to the concept that marriage is 
a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, 
that in many ways it is akin to a partner-
ship.] Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 
320 A.2d 496 (1974) . ] 
Alimony, on the other hand, is meant to impose on the 
supporting spouse the duty to give the dependent spouse 
sufficient financial support, within the means of the 
supporting spouse, to continue to live according to the 
economic standard that was established during the 
marriage. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501-502, 
453 A.2d 527 (1982) . 
This relationship between equitable distribution and 
alimony may require the dependent spouse to tap her 
assets, including property received in equitable 
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distribution, to absorb some of the diminution of the 
supporting spouse's ability to pay alimony when upon 
retirement his earned income is replaced by lower 
pension payments. 
We reject the D!Pro rule that whenever upon divorce a 
dependent spouse receives a lump sum share of the value 
of the supporting spouse's anticipated pension payments 
as part of equitable distribution, those pension 
payments or any portion thereof are not to be con-
sidered in readjusting alimony after the supporting 
spouse retires. The same is true for other assets that 
spouses acquired in equitable distribution, 
542 A.2d at 41-42. 
Under Innes and the cases cited in Point II of the Brief of 
Appellant, the trial court should consider Dr. Millikan's income 
from all sources in awarding Mrs. Millikan alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion and failed to make an 
equitable apportionment of the joint marital retirement assets. 
The trial court's non-distribution should be reversed, with 
instructions to find the $405,603.53 present value of the Mayo 
and Utah retirement assets and award Mrs. Millikan an immediate 
offset award of $125,848.07, together with her percentage 
interest in the $45,977 in IRA's. 
The trial court committed reversible error in excluding Dr. 
Scheinberg's letter regarding Dr. Millikan's private patient 
income. The trial court should be instructed to admit the letter 
or grant Mrs. Millikan the opportunity to complete discovery of 
Dr. Millikan's private patient income prior to retrial of the 
alimony issue. The trial court should be instructed to base its 
determination of alimony upon a consideration of Dr. Millikan's 
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income from all sources, including retirement benefits. 
the trial court committed reversible error in using the 
homeowners' policy 60% valuation figure, rather than Dr. Mil-
likan's valuation of the 27-page inventory supporting the policy. 
The issue of valuation of the household contents should be 
remanded for entry of the average valuation based upon the 
parties' actual figures, $52,944.89. 
This Court should deny Dr. Millikan's claim of frivolous 
appeal and request for costs under the doctrine of nlaw of the 
case." 
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